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THE BENEFITS OF PROTOTYPES: 
THE CASE OF MEDICAL 
CONCEPTS
M. Cristina Amoretti, Marcello Frixione, 
Antonio Lieto
Abstract. In the present paper, we shall discuss the notion of prototype and show 
its benefits. First, we shall argue that the prototypes of common-sense concepts are 
necessary for making prompt and reliable categorisations and inferences. However, 
the features constituting the prototype of a particular concept are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient conditions for determining category membership; in this sense, 
the prototype might lead to conclusions regarded as wrong from a theoretical per-
spective. That being said, the prototype remains essential to handling most ordinary 
situations and helps us to perform important cognitive tasks. To exemplify this point, 
we shall focus on disease concepts. Our analysis concludes that the prototypical 
conception of disease is needed to make important inferences from a practical and 
clinical point of view. Moreover, it can still be compatible with a classical definition 
of disease, given in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. In the first section, 
we shall compare the notion of stereotype, as it has been introduced in philosophy 
of language by Hilary Putnam, with the notion of prototype, as it has been developed 
in the cognitive sciences. In the second section, we shall discuss the general role of 
prototypical information in cognition and stress its centrality. In the third section, 
we shall apply our previous discussion to the specific case of medical concepts, 
before briefly summarising our conclusions in section four.
Keywords: concepts, definitions, disease, medicine, prototypes.
1. STEREOTYPES AND PROTOTYPES 
In philosophy of language, the term «stereotype» was introduced by 
Hilary Putnam (1975). He famously used the notion of stereotype 
to account for a speaker’s semantic competence, which is identified 
with her knowledge of the stereotypes associated with words. To put 
it briefly, a stereotype is «a standardized description of features of the 
kind that are typical, or ‘normal’, or at any rate stereotypical. The cen-
tral features of the stereotype generally are criteria – features which in 
normal situations constitute ways of recognizing if a thing belongs to 
the kind» (1975, 230), that is, ways of categorising a particular thing. A 
stereotype is «a conventional […] idea […] of what an X looks like or 
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acts like or is» (1975, 249). According to Putnam, a stereotype is thus 
an oversimplified theory of a word’s extension (for example, being yel-
low and shining, for gold; being black-and-yellow striped, and having 
long teeth, for tigers) that all competent speakers should know, as it is 
the required minimum level of competence to communicate with oth-
ers in a given linguistic community. However, knowing the stereotype 
does not suffice to know the meaning of a word or to fully grasp the 
concept associated with it, as they do not determine reference in the 
appropriate way: pyrite is yellow and shining without being gold, and 
some types of gold are not yellow; wax-made tigers are not tigers, while 
albino tigers are. Yet, some members of the linguistic community, that 
is the experts, are more competent than others at determining the fea-
tures that a thing should have in order to really belong to a particular 
kind and to be properly named with a certain word: for example, hav-
ing 79 as atomic number for gold; being a member of Panthera tigris 
because of specific biological features. Anyway, the stereotype associ-
ated with a word describes the typical thing associated to that word, 
or what the community takes it to be: the stereotype of gold describes 
the typical instance of gold; the stereotype of tiger describes the typi-
cal tiger; and so on. On this perspective, stereotypes are important 
tools that help us crucially in our everyday processes of categorisation; 
however, they merely work as heuristics that do not always allow for 
an accurate categorisation, as they are not sufficient, by themselves, to 
pick out the right extension of a term.
The notion of stereotype is often compared or confused with 
that of prototype. This latter notion has been introduced by Eleonor 
Rosch to account for the typicality effects that are exhibited by many 
common-sense concepts, such as fruit or bird.
Eleanor Rosch’s psychological experiments (Rosch 1975; Rosch, 
Mervis 1975) showed how common-sense concepts do not obey the 
requirements of the so-called classical theory, according to which con-
cepts must be defined in terms of sets of individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions. The majority of common-sense concepts 
cannot be defined in terms of a classical definition (and even if for 
some concepts such a definition is available, subjects do not use it in 
many cognitive tasks). Rather, concepts exhibit typicality effects: some 
members of a category are considered better instances than others. 
For example, a robin is considered a better example of the category of 
birds than, say, a penguin or an ostrich. More central instances share 
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certain typical features (e.g. the ability of flying for birds, having fur for 
mammals) that, in general, are neither necessary nor sufficient condi-
tions. Rosch explains such effects by hypothesising that concepts are 
mentally represented in terms of prototypes, where a prototype is a 
mental representation of a typical member of a given category. A pro-
totype is an ideal entity that does not necessary coincides with any real 
individual.
Obviously, the notion of stereotype and that of prototype have 
many relevant features in common and are, thus, very similar. How-
ever, they also differ in some important respects. On the one hand, 
the notion of stereotype was developed by Putnam in close relation-
ship with his particular conception of semantic meaning. The notion 
of stereotype thus belongs to philosophical semantics. On the other 
hand, the notion of prototype was developed by Rosch to account for 
typicality effects. In this respect, the notion of prototype belongs to 
empirical psychology and is not committed to the specific semantic 
theory proposed by Putnam. In order to avoid possible confusions, in 
what follows, we shall only use the term «prototype», as the arguments 
we discuss mostly come from the cognitive sciences. 
2. THE BENEFITS OF PROTOTYPES
Typicality effects in categorisation and, in general, in category rep-
resentation are crucial for human cognition. Under what conditions 
should we say that somebody knows the concept dog (or, in other 
terms, that he or she possesses an adequate mental representation of 
it)? It is not easy to say. However, if a person does not know that, for 
example, dogs usually bark, that they typically have four legs, that their 
body is covered with fur, that, in most cases, they have a tail and that 
they wag it when they are happy, then we should probably conclude 
that this person does not grasp the concept dog. Nevertheless, all of 
these pieces of information are neither necessary nor sufficient condi-
tions for being a dog. In fact, they are traits that characterise dogs in 
typical (or prototypical) cases. 
The concept dog is not exceptional from this point of view. The 
majority of everyday concepts behave in this way. For most concepts, 
a classical definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions 
is not available (or, even if it is available, it is unknown to the agent). 
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Moreover, it may be that we know the classical definition of a con-
cept, but typical/prototypical knowledge still plays a central role in 
many cognitive tasks. Consider the following example: nowadays most 
people know the necessary and sufficient conditions for being water: 
water is the chemical substance whose formula is H2O, i.e., the sub-
stance whose molecules are formed by one atom of oxygen and two 
atoms of hydrogen1. However, in most cases of everyday life, when we 
categorise something as water, we do not take advantage of this piece 
of knowledge. Instead, we use prototypical traits, such as the fact that 
(liquid) water is usually a colourless, odourless and tasteless fluid.
Human beings have a strong inclination to reason in prototypi-
cal terms. Consider, for example, the so-called Linda problem and the 
conjunction fallacy (Tversky, Kahneman 1983). In a well-known experi-
ment from the psychology of probabilistic reasoning, subjects are given 
a description of a person named Linda that perfectly fits the stereotype 
of a feminist activist («Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very 
bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply con-
cerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also partici-
pated in anti-nuclear demonstrations», Tversky, Kahneman 1983, 297). 
Then, they are asked to judge whether it is more likely that Linda is (a) 
a bank teller or (b) a bank teller and a feminist. The majority of subjects 
choose (b), without realising that being a feminist bank teller is in any 
case more demanding (and therefore less probable) than simply being a 
bank teller. Indeed, the conjunction fallacy consists in failing to realise 
that a conjunction is always less probable than its conjuncts. From the 
standpoint of a theory of reasoning, this is a paradigmatic case of a sys-
tematic error. However, if we consider the problem from the point of 
view of a theory of concepts, the conjunction fallacy can be interpreted 
as an example of the strong tendency of human subjects to resort to 
prototypical information in categorisation, even when this is not appro-
priate (at least from the point of view of those who devised the experi-
ment): Linda is categorised as a feminist because she perfectly fits the 
prototypical traits of a feminist (while she does not in the least fit the pro-
totypical traits of a bank teller). So, we could see the «error» as originat-
ing from a process of categorisation based on prototypical knowledge.
The use of prototypical knowledge in cognitive tasks such as 
categorisation is related to the constraints that concern every finite 
agent that has limited access to the knowledge relevant for a given 
task. In most cases, cognitive processes based on typical knowledge 
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are fast, automatic and cognitively undemanding (and are presumably 
homogenous to the processes employed in similar tasks by non-human 
animals). Consider, for example, the following variant of the Linda 
problem. Let us suppose that a certain individual named Pippo is de-
scribed as follows. He weighs about 200 kg, and he is approximately 
two meters tall. His body is covered with a thick, dark fur, he has a 
large mouth with robust teeth and paws with long claws. He roars and 
growls. Now, given this information, we have to evaluate the plausibil-
ity of the two following alternatives:
a’) Pippo is a mammal;
b’) Pippo is a mammal, and he is wild and dangerous.
Which is the «correct» answer? According to the dictates of the 
normative theory of probability, it is surely (a’). However, if you were 
to encounter Pippo in the wilderness, it would be more appropriate to 
infer (b’).
This is an example of a default inference, in which a cognitive 
agent «jumps to a conclusion» on the basis of incomplete information. 
Typicality effects in categorisation and default inferences are closely 
related. For example, birds, by default (or prototypically), are able to 
fly; therefore, given that Tweety is a bird, you can jump to the provi-
sional conclusion that Tweety is able to fly. Of course, you must be 
prepared to withdraw this conclusion should Tweety turn out to be 
atypical in his flying abilities (because, for example, he is an ostrich, 
a penguin, or a featherless chick). Such an inference from incomplete 
premises is an example of what is called non-monotonic reasoning (see 
e.g. Koons 2013). 
Default values that allow the drawing of non-monotonic infer-
ences are akin to prototypical knowledge. In other words, associating 
prototypical information to concepts turns out to be useful in order to 
make defeasible inferences starting from incomplete knowledge. 
Default information is involved in countless cognitive tasks, such 
as reasoning on actions and events. Furthermore, consider the default 
assumptions that need to be built into the visual system in order to 
solve the ill-posed problem of reconstructing the properties of distal 
stimuli starting from incomplete proximal information. As such, it is 
likely that default «inferences» are exploited at many different levels 
of the cognitive architecture in completely independent components.
The existence of typicality effects is probably the most solid re-
sult achieved in the psychological research on concepts. Typicality ef-
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fects in categorisation and, in general, in category representation are 
crucial for human cognition. However, it can be argued that typical-
ity effects, far from being a symptom of some homogeneous cogni-
tive structure, are more plausibly the consequence of some «ecologi-
cal constraints» acting on the mind (Frixione 2013). In other words, 
our way of categorising the world does not exhibit typicality effects 
because our mind is structured in a particular way; rather, typicality 
effects are determined by the fact that the world interacts in a certain 
way with our mind. 
This could have important consequences for the status of the no-
tion of «concept» within the sciences of the mind. Since «conceptual» 
abilities such as categorisation are crucial for many cognitive tasks, 
it is plausible that different components of the cognitive architecture 
developed similar behaviours with respect to different tasks and differ-
ent domains. Since these components are subject to similar constraints 
(such as limited access to information), it should not be surprising that 
this process should converge on similar solutions. Typicality effects in 
categorisation could be an example of such a «convergent evolution» 
within the mind.
Moreover, default reasoning is a widespread cognitive phenom-
enon that is likely to be determined by ecological constraints, namely 
by the need for cognitive agents to face various inferential problems 
with limited access to relevant knowledge.
In other words, it can be hypothesised that the emergence of 
typicality effects is in some sense analogous to convergent evolution in 
living beings: in some cases, species of different (and remote) lineages 
evolved similar characters as a response to similar ecological condi-
tions. An example is the hydrodynamic shape evolved by pelagic fish-
es, dolphins and ichthyosauri. A further example is offered by the cat-
egory of the so-called fat plants (or succulent plants), which constitute 
a heterogeneous group, including phylogenetically distant organisms, 
but which share convergent adaptations to similar ecosystems. For ex-
ample, consider the spines and succulent tissues developed in such 
phylogenetically remote families as Cactaceae and Euphorbiaceae.
So, typicality effects, far from being a symptom of some homoge-
neous cognitive structure underlying categorisation, could, more plau-
sibly, be the effect of some «ecological constraints» acting on the mind. 
In other words, our way of categorising the world does not exhibit 
typicality effects because our mind is structured in a particular way; 
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rather, typicality effects are caused by the fact that the world interacts 
with our mind in a certain way. Typicality effects emerge as a result 
of the constraints that the environment imposes on any (finite) agent 
interacting with it. As such, they do not reveal any particular, specific 
feature of the human mind: all cognitive agents that have to survive in 
their environment would develop categories with a similar structure 
in order to solve similar problems. Obviously, this does not say very 
much about how these problems have been solved by the human cog-
nitive system, nor does it involve some common cognitive mechanism 
underlying typicality effects. If this position is tenable, then the role of 
the concept of «concept» in cognitive science should be similar to the 
role of the concept of «fat plant» in botany: it should be of some utility 
in certain cases, but it needs not correspond to a genuine taxon (i.e., 
to a genuine kind).
In order to explain the «ecological» character of the constraints 
at the basis of prototypical behaviour, let us consider the following 
cases, which are in some sense paradigmatic. It may happen that, in 
order to accomplish their purposes, cognitive agents have the need to 
classify their environment according to categories that:
i. are intrinsically fuzzy (or vague); or
ii. do not correspond to an underlying common nature (e.g. to 
natural kinds); or
iii. correspond to substances whose essence is (totally or par-
tially) unknown.
Point i. includes the case of categories that establish arbitrary 
discontinuities in phenomena that are intrinsically continuous. A para-
digmatic example of this kind is colours: the chromatic spectrum is a 
continuum, and any way to categorise colours would give rise to vague 
concepts. Such categories cannot have clear-cut boundaries. Conse-
quently, any chromatic category will exhibit better and worse exem-
plars, and forms of typicality effects will arise.
Point ii. includes cases in which typicality effects are determined 
by the fact that a category needs not to «capture an essence», i.e., it does 
not «carve the world at its joints». In order to satisfy their needs, cog-
nitive agents are often interested in grouping together entities in ways 
that do not correspond to the «deep structure» of the world. Paradig-
matic exemples, in this sense, are categories that include natural enti-
ties, which, however, are grouped together according to criteria that, 
being determined by the agent’s needs and purposes, are extrinsic to the 
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organisation of the natural world. Good examples are food categories. 
Consider such lexical categories as vegetable, fruit (as contrasted to 
vegetable) or seafood. vegetables, for example, include quite hetero-
geneous parts of vegetal organisms such as seeds, fruits, leaves, flowers, 
roots and branches. In the category of seafood almost all animal phyla 
are represented: mainly Chordata (Fishes), Mollusca and Artropoda 
(Crustacea above all), but also Echinodermata and Coelenterata2.
It could be argued that, even if such categories do not corre-
spond to natural kinds from a strictly taxonomical point of view, they 
could rather be considered «substances» from a biochemical stand-
point: they include biological tissues that can be assimilated by the 
human organism. However, this does not constitute a sufficient con-
dition. For example, in order to consider some stuff as vegetable or 
seafood, further constraints must be satisfied. Its taste must not be 
disgusting, it must not be dangerous due to the presence of poisons or 
parasites, it must be easy enough to collect in satisfactory quantities, 
and so on (leaving apart cultural and anthropological constraints, may-
be partially motivated by practical considerations, such as the rules of 
kasherut for Jews or the prohibition of cannibalism – cf. Harris 1985). 
For example, Amanita caesarea is a rather atypical (not even being a 
plant) example of a vegetable, however, the poisonous Amanita phal-
loides cannot be considered as a vegetable, despite the biological simi-
larity of these two species. Analogously, Littorina neritoides is not cat-
egorised as seafood, due to its small size, while the zoologically similar 
Littorina littorea counts as a good example of this category. 
Case iii. includes those categories that correspond to an underly-
ing nature that is (totally or partially) unknown to a cognitive agent. 
Consider the example of water mentioned above. In such cases, the 
agent adopts stereotypes (in the sense of Putnam 1975) that are partial 
and fallible, and which, therefore, give rise to uncertain and dubious 
cases that better fit some exemplars of a substance than others. 
From a cognitive point of view, iii. is not dissimilar to the case of 
categories for which a classical, clear-cut definition is available, which, 
however, is unknown by the cognitive agent. Imagine an undergradu-
ate student who knows that some members of the faculty are full pro-
fessors, without exactly knowing how the concept full professor is 
defined. This student would probably develop a «stereotype» that will 
help him in dealing with the academic world: full professors are usu-
ally older than their colleagues, they have greater authority and power, 
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sometimes they are more erudite and have greater scientific prestige, 
frequently they are more arrogant, and so on.
In cases ii. and iii., typicality effects do not depend (only) on 
the vagueness of the employed criteria, but also on the «bad corre-
spondence» between identification criteria and the world. Criteria are 
intrinsically imprecise, and give rise to dubious cases. In any case, all 
the above-mentioned cases give rise to typicality effects.
A further aspect deserves some consideration. It is well known 
from psychological experiments that human behaviour also exhibits 
typicality effects in the case of fully classical categories (examples can 
be found in arithmetic or geometry). This could be used against the 
thesis that typicality effects depend on ecological constraints and do 
not correspond to any specific feature of the cognitive representation 
of categories. The fact that people even exhibit prototypical behav-
iours for classical categories could be explained in terms of some deep 
feature of human conceptual representation. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. We can account for typicality effects for classical 
categories by adopting a distinction similar to the core/identification 
procedures distinction proposed by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) 
(on this point, see for example Armstrong et al. 1983 and Rey 1983). 
There are cases in which the classical definition of some category (its 
core) is well known but where, in many practical cases, it cannot be 
applied and, instead, people must trust fallible criteria. For example, 
even if I know perfectly well what a grandmother is, when I catego-
rise somebody as a grandmother I can seldom use the definition and 
must often rely on fallible criteria: grandmothers are old women with 
white hair, they are kind to children and so on. In some sense, this 
example is similar to case iii. above. It is also likely that, in the case 
of formal (mathematical) concepts, typicality effects probably depend 
on identification procedures. Let us consider even numbers. We tend 
to consider number 4 as a more «typical» specimen of this category 
than, say, 351,274,195,336. This is probably due to the fact that small 
even numbers (2, 4, 6, 8…) are presumably explicitly stored in our 
memory in some sort of lookup table, and are therefore easy to check 
and generate. For larger numbers, such as 351,274,195,336, we need a 
procedure («check the last figure on the right») that, albeit simple, is 
more demanding (at least because it requires the procedure for small 
numbers as a part of the whole process). Compare this with the case 
of prime numbers: small prime numbers (2, 3, 5, 7, 11…) are explicitly 
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stored in memory, and we can recognise them at a glance, whilst for 
larger numbers (e.g. 2,750,159) a rather complicated and time-con-
suming procedure is needed. 
That typicality effects do not correspond to some specific fea-
ture of mental organisation is supported by the fact that, in some cat-
egorisation experiments, people dealing with abstract stimuli that have 
been carefully prepared by experimenters to favour the emergence of 
typicality effects, prefer to individuate classical categories (Medin et al. 
1987). (In some sense, these results show that our mind has no particu-
lar bias against classical concepts and definitions. Rather, the problem 
is that classical concepts are not particularly useful for an agent with 
limited access to the world.) 
The hypothesis that typicality effects could not correspond to 
some specific mental structure or to some specific feature of the cogni-
tive system is corroborated by the observation that, in computational 
artificial systems, forms of «prototypical behaviour» can be obtained 
using very different computational devices. Typicality effects can be 
modelled by adopting, for example, some non-monotonic logical for-
malism (see Giordano et al. 2013); symbolic models of associative 
memory, such as frames (Minsky 1975) or inheritance networks (Horty 
et al. 1990); artificial (supervised or unsupervised) neural networks 
(see e.g. Socher et al. 2013; Blouw et al. 2016); or conceptual spaces 
(see e.g. Gärdenfors, Williams 2001; Lieto et al. 2015).
3. A CASE STUDY: THE CONCEPT OF DISEASE
Focusing on a contentious and debated concept in philosophy of med-
icine, that of disease, we shall exemplify how prototypical concepts 
have a positive and important role from a practical point of view, in 
the domain of clinical medicine, as they may be very useful in everyday 
and clinical situations. At the same time, we shall maintain that their 
«negative» side, that is, the fact that prototypical concepts may result 
in incorrect categorisations, makes them compatible with the possibil-
ity that a classical and «conceptually-clean» definition of the concept 
of disease, in terms of necessary (and sufficient) conditions, might 
eventually be found from the perspective of theoretical medicine.
To put it differently, we wish to show that, even if the prototypical 
disease may eventually lead to categorisations considered wrong from 
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the point of view of theoretical medicine, it is still essential for prompt-
ly and reliably handling most ordinary situations and, thus, guiding 
practical or clinical medicine. For this reason, the prototypical concept 
of disease can be regarded as highly valuable and beneficial. However, 
as a prototypical concept does not pretend to exactly characterise the 
concept of disease, but simply provides a reliable means to promptly, 
but also fallibly, distinguish between health and pathological condi-
tions, it is still compatible with the possibility that the concept of disease 
would be definable in terms of necessary (and sufficient) conditions. 
In this sense, we shall maintain that the prototypical theory of 
disease, as developed, for instance, by Lilienfield and Marino (1995, 
1999) or Sadeh-Zadeh (2000, 2008, 2011), can eventually be consid-
ered compatible with the «classical» conception of disease, which 
rather aims to find necessary and sufficient conditions to define the 
concept of disease. Here the proposals are quite different to each oth-
er. It has been variously argued that all and only diseases are: biological 
dysfunctions, that is, conditions that are either impairments of normal 
functional ability (i.e., reductions of functional abilities below typical 
efficiency) or limitations on functional ability, caused by environmen-
tal agents (Boorse 1977, 1997, 2014); harmful dysfunctions, that is, 
conditions that result from the inability of some internal mechanism to 
perform that particular effect which is part of the evolutionary expla-
nation of its existence and structure, and also cause some harm to the 
organism, as judged by cultural or social standards (Wakefield 1992); 
conditions that undermine one’s own ability to fulfil all one’s vital goals, 
that is those goals which are necessary and jointly sufficient for minimal 
happiness (Nordenfelt 1987); abnormal conditions that harm standard 
members of a species in standard circumstances, and for which medi-
cal intervention is both necessary and appropriate (Reznek 1987); con-
ditions that are bad things to have, make the afflicted person unlucky, 
and are potentially medically treatable (Cooper 2002); incapacitating 
conditions that reduce one’s own flourishing (Megone 2000, 2007). 
To be clear, in the present paper we do not mean to take a side 
either in favour or against any of the above definitions of disease, nor 
to maintain that a classical and «conceptually-clean» definition of dis-
ease can eventually be found; less ambitiously, we would like to show a 
viable way for making the above classical characterisations compatible 
with the idea that the concept of disease also has a prototypical struc-
ture. To put it another way, we would like to say that, from the point 
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of view of the cognitive sciences, what is at stake are two different 
ways to represent the concept of disease, produced by different cogni-
tive systems, and these two kinds of representations are both impor-
tant in their own specific domain and for their own particular scope. 
This means that, even if it would be possible to define the concept of 
disease in classical terms through necessary and sufficient conditions, 
typical knowledge linked to the prototypical concept would still play 
a central role in many cognitive tasks, more precisely, in practical and 
clinical decision making. As we have shown in the previous section, 
we can account for typicality effects for classical concepts by adopting 
a distinction similar to the core/identification procedures distinction 
proposed by Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976): even if we have a clas-
sical definition of the concept of disease (its core), in many practical 
cases it cannot be applied and, thus, we must trust fallible criteria com-
ing from the prototypical concept of disease.
At this stage, it is important to focus on the prototypical view 
about the concept of disease in more details. As we have seen in the 
previous sections, prototypical concepts are characterised by a set of 
features; none of these features is individually necessary and no group 
of them is jointly sufficient to determine category membership. In this 
sense, the prototypical disease is a theoretical entity that does not need 
to correspond to any real disease. Consequently, different conditions 
may still belong to the disease category even if they share just a few 
features or, at least in principle, no feature at all (providing that those 
features do constitute the disease category). That being said, the pro-
totypical concept of disease would obviously consist of both central 
and marginal examples. On the one hand, conditions such as tubercu-
losis, pneumonia or breast cancer are relatively prototypical examples 
for most individuals, and, thus, there is widespread agreement in con-
sidering them diseases. On the other hand, micromastia, cellulite or al-
coholism may easily count as dubious conditions for many individuals, 
and, thus, there may be intractable disagreements regarding which of 
them truly belong to the category of diseases. 
However, what might be the features constituting the category 
of disease that help us to promptly distinguish between health and 
pathological conditions? According to Merriam Webster, a disease is 
«a condition that prevents the body or mind from working normally; a 
problem that a person, group, organisation, or society has and cannot 
stop». Cambridge Dictionary similarly states that a disease is «some-
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thing that is considered very bad in people or society». Another com-
mon view associates the concept of disease with the lack of health, 
where health is defined by the World Health Organization as «a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being» (World Health 
Organization 1948). The above characterisations can be reasonably 
helpful to extrapolate some features commonly associated to the con-
cept of disease; it is: 
– a deviation from normality;
– not eliminable with a mere act of will;
– very bad;
– something that causes harm;
– something that affects one’s own general well-being;
– a decrease of one’s own physical functioning;
– a decrease of one’s own psychological functioning;
– something that compromises one’s own social role.
Looking at the philosophical literature where the prototypical 
conception of disease is proposed (see e.g. Lilienfield, Marino 1995, 
1997), we may want to add other features such as:
– an evolutionary dysfunction;
– maladaptive;
– something with an onset, a course, and an outcome;
– medically treatable;
– something that obstructs the fulfilment of one’s own goals.
Let’s take stock here and assume that the prototypical concept 
of disease would be constituted by all these features and, obviously, 
others. If someone does not associate many of the above features to 
the concept of disease, we should probably conclude that they do not 
grasp the concept of disease at all. This rough characterisation of the 
prototypical concept of disease would assist us in making quick and 
reliable categorisations about diseases, which, in most cases, would be 
helpful to reliably and promptly distinguish between healthy and path-
ological conditions. That being said, the prototypical characterisation 
of disease may also lead to incorrect categorisations from the point of 
view of theoretical medicine, as all the above features are neither nec-
essary nor sufficient conditions for being a disease. 
For reasons of simplicity, let us focus on the prototypical struc-
ture of some syndrome-based descriptions of individual diseases. For 
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example, influenza may be characterised by the following signs and 
symptoms (of course, among various others), which often guide every-
day judgements and prompt clinical diagnoses: 
– high fever;
– coldness;
– cough;
– nasal congestion;
– runny nose;
– sneezing;
– body aches;
– sore throat;
– fatigue;
– headache.
All the above features are signs and symptoms that character-
ise influenza in prototypical cases; however, none of them is either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition for correctly diagnosing influenza. 
On the one hand, the overall syndrome characterising the prototypical 
concept of influenza is clearly common to many other diseases, such 
as bacterial pneumonia (which, as the name suggests, obviously has a 
very different aetiology), and may thus lead to incorrect categorisations. 
Influenza is, in fact, an infectious disease caused by one of the three 
influenza viruses (Influenza A virus, Influenza B virus, or Influenza C 
virus), which thus count as necessary conditions for having influenza. 
That being said, as we have argued in the previous section, as-
sociating prototypical information to concepts turns out to be useful in 
order to make defeasible inferences starting from incomplete knowl-
edge, as in the case of medical diagnoses. In this respect, syndrome-
based diagnoses are pragmatically useful and can be interpreted as 
specific-domain examples of the strong tendency of human subjects to 
resort to prototypical information in categorisation, even when it is not 
fully appropriate (at least from the point of view of theoretical medi-
cine). To put it differently, even if we are able to define the concept of 
influenza in classical terms, at least through its necessary conditions 
(the presence of one of the three influenza viruses), typical knowledge 
based on the prototypical concept of influenza still plays a central role 
in many cognitive tasks, and, in particular, in doing quick and reliable 
diagnoses. For instance, as influenza reaches its peak prevalence in cold 
seasons and it is more prevalent than bacterial pneumonia, it would be 
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reasonable to prescribe medications such as acetaminophen, instead 
of antibiotics, to an individual showing the above symptoms in winter. 
The use of typical knowledge in diagnostic tasks has to do with the 
constraints that concern every finite agent that has a limited access to 
the knowledge relevant for correctly categorising an individual disease.
4. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, disease concepts (both the concepts of individual diseases 
and the general concept of disease) exhibit typicality effects that can 
be successfully explained in terms of prototypes. The prototypical 
characterisation of disease may lead to wrong characterisations from 
the point of view of theoretical medicine, however, it is still very useful 
to sort out pragmatic and clinical tasks in a prompt and reliable way. 
This means that the prototypical and the classical characterisations of 
the general concept of disease (and of the concepts of individual dis-
eases as well) might still be compatible, as they respond to different 
cognitive tasks and are performed by different cognitive systems.
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ENDNOTES
1 This, in strict terms, is not a definition, since it is a piece of a posteriori knowled-
ge. But, for our present purposes, this is not relevant.
2 Similar examples involving the fruit category have also been advanced by Bor-
ghini (2016).
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